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INTRODUCTION
Thanks to the adoption of Megan's Laws in all fifty states' and
the rise of a large background check industry that caters to employers,
landlords, lenders, and other important decisionmakers, information
about criminal histories is becoming more accessible than ever before.
The same is true of financial information, such as bankruptcy records,
credit records, and other evidence of past financial distress. Google
and other search engines have made it easier for decisionmakers to
locate other information about individuals that may have some bear-
ing on their fitness for a job, an apartment, a loan, or another oppor-
tunity.2 For the most part, information privacy scholars have be-
moaned these developments.' Privacy critics have responded by sug-
gesting that the availability of this information results in more accurate
decisions about hiring and that efforts to use privacy law to block the
dissemination of this information will compromise economic efficiency.
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I See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Reject Challenges to Megan's Laws, NY Times A29 (Mar
6, 2003) (providing general background to Megan's Laws, now promulgated in all fifty states,
"which impose registration restrictions on tens of thousands of [sex offenders]").
2 See, for example, Alan Finder, When a Risqug Online Persona Undermines a Chance for
a Job, NY Times sec 1 at 1 (June 11, 2006) ("Many companies that recruit on college campuses
have been using search engines like Google and Yahoo to conduct background checks on seniors
looking for their first job.").
3 For some examples of work in this vein, see generally Daniel J. Solove, The Future of
Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet (Yale 2007); Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Quixot-
ics Unite! Engaging the Pragmatists on Rational Discrimination, in David Lyon, ed, Theorizing
Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond 318 (Willan 2006); Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person:
Technology and Privacy in the Information Age (NYU 2004); Stan Karas, Privacy, Identity, Data-
bases, 52 Am U L Rev 393 (2002); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 Stan L Rev
1461 (2000); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
Stan L Rev 1373 (2000). For a more optimistic take, see David Brin, The Transparent Society: Will
Technology Force Us to Choose between Privacy and Freedom? 13 (Addison-Wesley 1998).
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This essay seeks to add one important argument to the debate
over the proliferation of information about individuals' involvement
in the criminal justice system, financial distress, or other embarrassing
activities.4 It suggests that by increasing the availability of information
about individuals, we can reduce decisionmakers' reliance on informa-
tion about groups. Put another way, there is often an essential conflict
between information privacy protections and antidiscrimination prin-
ciples, such that reducing privacy protections will reduce the preva-
lence of distasteful statistical discrimination. The essay draws heavily
on a series of recent economic papers finding that in the absence of
accurate information about individuals' criminal histories, employers
who are interested in weeding out those with criminal records will rely
instead on racial and gender proxies.
In framing this project, it is worth identifying my priors at the
outset. I care about information privacy protections. But I care more
about antidiscrimination protections. Were it possible to sacrifice in-
formation privacy interests to reduce the prevalence of racial dis-
crimination or other forms of unlawful discrimination, that is a trade-
off that I would be willing to make, particularly where the information
privacy interests at stake implicate neither intimate association nor
political association. Some readers may not share that hierarchy of
interests, but my goal in this project is to help advocates of greater
information privacy protections recognize all the collateral conse-
quences of those policies.
I. THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND ANTIDISCRIMINATION
Newspaper reporters have recently noticed the difficulties that
African-American professionals in big cities encounter when trying to
hire a nanny. Young couples expressed frustration that among nannies,
African-American clients were widely seen as being too demanding,
living in unsafe neighborhoods, or unable to pay as much as white
couples.' Perhaps most frustrating of all: these stereotypes seemed to
be shared by nannies of all backgrounds, including African Americans
and Caribbeans.6 Similar phenomena have been used to explain the
difficulties that African-American professionals have hailing cabs suc-
cessfully-African-American riders are viewed as less-safe passengers
4 I develop a more comprehensive theory of the relationship between information privacy
and competing policy interests in Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of
Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 Nw U L Rev (forthcoming 2008). That article also elabo-
rates on some of the arguments that I introduce in this symposium contribution.
5 Jodi Kantor, Nanny Hunt Can Be a "Slap in the Face for Blacks," NY Times Al (Dec 26,
2006).
6 Id.
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and poorer tippers.7 Waiters similarly perceive African Americans as
poor tippers, an expectation that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy if
African Americans receive less attentive service as a result.'
Racial animus explains some of this behavior, but in the standard
narrative, statistical discrimination is doing most of the work.9 That is,
nannies are looking for good employers and associate race with em-
ployer quality. After all, if African-American nannies are reluctant to
work for African-American parents, it is hard to construct a compel-
ling animus-based story about why that would be so. Along the same
lines, cab drivers are looking for good tippers and reliable payers, and
believe that passenger race predicts these behaviors. Statistical dis-
crimination is based, not on irrational animus, but on the use of heuris-
tics by decisionmakers who believe-correctly or not-that observable
hallmarks of membership in a group correlate with some undesirable
characteristic. One premise of this paper is that in modern America,
statistical discrimination is more prevalent than animus-based racism. '°
It is in many ways a more tempting form of discriminatory behavior,
since, unlike animus-based discrimination, it will often be rational.
To illustrate how statistical discrimination plays out in contempo-
rary society, suppose a person charged with hiring a sales clerk wants
to avoid employing someone with a criminal background. A majority
of employers evidently refuse to hire ex-convicts, and this reluctance
stands in sharp contrast to their widespread willingness to hire mem-
bers of other stigmatized groups, such as welfare recipients, GED
holders, and applicants who had been unemployed for a year or
longer." We can tell a number of stories about why this particular
7 See Ian Ayres, Fredrick E. Vars, and Nasser Zakariya, To Insure Prejudice: Racial Dis-
parities in Taxicab Tipping, 114 Yale L J 1613,1648-53 (2005).
8 Michael Lynn, Ethnic Differences in Tipping: A Matter of Familiarity with Tipping
Norms, 45 Cornell Hotel & Restaurant Admin Q 12, 12 (2004).
9 On statistical discrimination, see David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial
Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 Georgetown L J 1619,
1622-24, 1626-30, 1639-43 (1991); Stewart Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination Efficient?, 76 Am
Econ Rev 228, 229 (1986). See also Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias,
94 Cal L Rev 969,974-75 (2006) (describing implicit bias as a problematic decisionmaking heuristic).
10 For a discussion of the decline of overt discrimination and the rise of statistical discrimi-
nation and implicit bias, see generally Rachel F. Moran, Whatever Happened to Racism?, 79 St
John's L Rev 899 (2005).
11 Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael, and Michael A. Stoll, Will Employers Hire Former
Offenders?: Employer Preferences, Background Checks, and Their Determinants, in Mary Pattillo,
David Weiman, and Bruce Western, eds, Imprisoning America: The Social Effects of Mass Incar-
ceration 205,210-11 (Russell Sage 2004):
Approximately 92 percent of employers indicated that they would definitely or probably
hire former or current welfare recipients, 96 percent indicated that they would probably or
definitely hire workers with a GED in lieu of a high school diploma, 59 percent indicated
that they would hire workers with a spotty employment history, and 83 percent indicated
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aversion to hiring ex-offenders is rational. 2 Someone with a criminal
conviction in his past could be less trustworthy than someone without
such a conviction. Hiring someone with a criminal background could
expose an employer to vicarious liability under a variety of theories,
and in some job sectors it is unlawful to hire someone with a felony
conviction." In any event, assuming the decisionmaker lacks reliable
access to information about applicants' criminal records, he might
choose to hire a Caucasian female over an equally qualified African-
American male, based on the relatively high percentage of African-
American males and the relatively low percentage of Caucasian fe-
males who are involved in the criminal justice system." This decision-
making process will impose a distasteful form of collective punish-
ment on African-American males who have had no run-ins with the
law, penalizing them for crimes that others have committed. Because
many decisionmakers may exercise the same decisionmaking criteria,
a law-abiding African-American male may face repeated rejection
and economic marginalization.5 For these reasons, antidiscrimination
law prohibits the use of these race or gender proxies even where race
or gender might correlate with some relevant qualification.1
6
Policing statistical discrimination has proved difficult: many vic-
tims of this sort of discrimination never bring suit, many nonvictims
do bring suit, and enforcement of the laws by the Justice Department
and state attorneys general has been sporadic. 7 Concerned about an
avalanche of claims, a number of appellate courts have imposed sub-
stantial burdens on plaintiffs seeking to enforce antidiscrimination
that they would probably or definitely consider an application from an individual who has
been unemployed for a year or more. In contrast, only 38 percent of employers said that
they definitely or probably would accept an application from an [sic] former offender.
12 For an illuminating discussion of the legal and moral issues implicated by this sort, and
other sorts, of profiling, see Frederick Schauer, Profiles Probabilities and Stereotypes 16-17, 155-223
(Belknap 2003).
13 Shawn D. Bushway, Labor Market Effects of Permitting Employer Access to Criminal
History Records, 20 J Contemp Crim Just 276,277 (2004).
14 See Kathleen Daly and Michael Tonry, Gender, Race, and Sentencing, 22 Crime & Just
201,201-03 (1997).
15 See Strauss, 79 Georgetown L J at 1626-29 (cited in note 9).
16 See Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation
Plans v Norris, 463 US 1073, 1085 n 15 (1983) ("Title VII clearly would not permit use of race ...
as a proxy for such an employment qualification, regardless of whether a statistical correlation
could be established.").
17 Francis Carleton and Jennifer Nutt Carleton, An Ethic of Care Applied: A Critical
Analysis of Affirmative Action Jurisprudence, 8 Temple Polit & Civ Rts L Rev 87, 109-10 (1998);
Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Em-
ployment, 45 UCLA L Rev 1401, 1429-30 (1998).
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laws, often hamstringing discovery, interpreting statutes of limitations
aggressively, or hastening resolution of claims on summary judgment.8
A. Empirical Evidence of Statistical Discrimination
A fascinating recent paper in the Journal of Law and Economics
by Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll illustrates the prevalence of statistical
discrimination and the failure of antidiscrimination laws to curtail it.'N
The paper began by noting that 28 percent of African-American
males, 16 percent of Hispanic males, and 4 percent of white males
would be incarcerated at some point in their lives, and that the median
prison sentence was less than two years. 2 As a result, Holzer and his
co-authors observed that a sizable minority of the male labor pool in
the United States consists of people with criminal records.' The study
then surveyed employers about their most recent hire for a position
that did not require a college degree. The authors collected demo-
graphic information about each firm's most recent hire and information
about the firm's willingness to hire employees with criminal records
generally.
The findings of the study suggested that statistical discrimination
against African-American males is widespread and that employers
were using race as a proxy for involvement in the criminal justice sys-
tem. Employers who conducted criminal background checks on appli-
cants were more than 50 percent more likely to hire African Ameri-
cans than employers who did not (24 percent versus 14.8 percent, re-
spectively)." Consistent with the statistical discrimination hypothesis,
the effect was highly significant for employers who expressed unwill-
ingness to hire ex-offenders (10.7 percent greater likelihood) and only
18 See, for example, Ledbetter v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, Inc, 127 S Ct 2162, 2165
(2007), (construing the time limit for filing employment discrimination claims with the EEOC
narrowly); Brown v City of Oneonta, 221 F3d 329, 338-39 (2d Cir 2000) (holding that despite
potential disparate impact, the law enforcement's stopping of suspects on the basis of gender and
race did not violate equal protection absent evidence of discriminatory racial animus). See also
Matt Graves, Note, Purchasing While Black: How Courts Condone Discrimination in the Market-
place, 7 Mich J Race & L 159, 185 (2001) (discussing how many judges have viewed certain anti-
discrimination suits "with a presumption of frivolousness"), citing Judith Olans Brown, Stephen
N. Subrin, and Phyllis Tropper Baumann, Some Thoughts about Perception and Employment
Discrimination Law:A Modest Proposal for Reopening the Judicial Dialogue, 46 Emory L J 1487,
1489-90 (1997).
19 Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael, and Michael A. Stoll, Perceived Criminality, Criminal
Background Checks and the Racial Hiring Practices of Employers, 49 J L & Econ 451,452 (2006).
20 Idat451.
21 Id. See also Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 Am J Soc 937,938 (2003)
(noting that approximately 8 percent of the working-age population of the United States are ex-
felons).
22 Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, 49 J L & Econ at 464 (cited in note 19).
23 Id.
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marginally significant for employers who stated their willingness to
hire ex-offenders (4.8 percent greater likelihood). 4 The effects for Af-
rican-American males were far greater than the effects for African-
American females," which is consistent with the statistical discrimina-
tion hypothesis and hard to square with a racial animus hypothesis.
Further, the study found the same effects even after controlling for
differences in the racial composition of the applicant pool." The study
also found evidence that surveyed employers who do not conduct
criminal background checks used other proxies for criminal convic-
tions as well, including spotty work history and being unemployed for
more than a year, and that those employers who expressed unwilling-
ness to hire ex-offenders were significantly less likely to hire members
of these stigmatized groups."
Surveying their results, the study authors reached the following
conclusion about the effects of statistical discrimination on African-
American job applicants:
[T]he empirical estimates indicate that employers who perform
criminal background checks are more likely to hire black appli-
cants than employers that do not.... [T]his positive net effect in-
dicates that the adverse consequences of employer-initiated
background checks on the likelihood of hiring African Ameri-
cans is more than offset by the positive effect of eliminating sta-
tistical discrimination.
In addition, we find that the positive effect of criminal back-
ground checks on the likelihood that an employer hires a black
applicant is larger among firms that are unwilling to hire ex-
offenders. This pattern is consistent with the proposition that
employers with a particularly strong aversion to ex-offenders
may be more likely to overestimate the relationship between
criminality and race and hence hire too few African Americans
as a result.2'
24 Id at 464-65.
25 Id at 465-66, 470-71.
26 Id at 473.
27 Id at 472.
28 Id at 473. One of the authors of this study recently hedged this conclusion somewhat,
noting that the desirability of promoting access to criminal records would depend on the amount
of time for which a prior conviction would act as a reliable proxy for future conduct and the degree
of nuance in employer reactions to prior convictions. See Steven Raphael, Should Criminal History
Records Be Universally Available?, 5 Criminol & Pub Policy 515,516-17,519-20 (2006).
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The implications of the study and of similar studies on the em-
ployment market by the same authors are horrifying, but they should
not be surprising. Many employers wish to avoid hiring ex-offenders.
Employers who expend resources on criminal background checks will
be able to sort effectively among those African Americans who have
had run-ins with law enforcement and those who have not, but other
employers will rely on race as a proxy for criminality, imposing a dis-
tasteful sanction on law-abiding African-American males. According
to the Holzer et al study, information privacy protections for ex-cons
seem likely to harm African-American males as a whole because they
thwart employers' ability to sort between those African-American
males who have criminal records and those who do not.
The Holzer et al papers comprise the most technically impressive
approach to this particular issue, but they are not the only scholars to
examine these questions. A handful of other papers have examined
the effects of increased automation of criminal history records on the
aggregate employment of ex-offenders and racial minorities, and they
reached divergent conclusions. Keith Finlay, while a graduate student
in economics at UC Irvine, concluded in an unpublished paper that
the automation of criminal history records and their availability on
the internet in some states was associated with a decrease in the em-
ployment of young African-American males of slightly more than 2
percent." These results were statistically significant. By contrast,
Shawn Bushway, a Professor of Criminology at SUNY-Albany, used
essentially the same data set"' and found that African Americans have
higher wages in those states that have automated access to criminal
history records to the greatest degree, and he attributes this finding to
statistical discrimination in those states that have not automated ac-
cess.32 Unlike Finlay, Bushway found that access to criminal history
29 Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, 49 J L & Econ at 473 (cited in note 19) ("The results of this
study suggest that curtailing access to criminal history records may actually harm more people
than it helps and aggravate racial differences in labor market outcomes.").
30 Keith Finlay, Employer Access to Criminal History Data and the Employment of Young
Black Men 22 (unpublished paper, Sept 2006), online at http://www.economics.uci.edu/docs/
colloqpapers/fO6/grad/Finlay.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008) (finding that access to criminal history re-
cords was associated with a 2.34 percent decrease in the relative employment of young black men).
31 Finlay and Bushway both used employment data from the Current Population Survey,
though the years they selected differed, and a ranking of internet accessibility of criminal history
records prepared by the Legal Action Center in 2004. Finlay used the Legal Action Center's
rankings as a starting point and supplemented them with his own estimates of when the publica-
tion of criminal history information began. Although the Legal Action Center's ratings at-
tempted to report the relative degree of accessibility, Finlay appears to have transformed acces-
sibility into a binary choice. See id at 30 nn a-b. Bushway, by contrast, did not modify the Legal
Action Center's rankings. See Bushway, 20 J Contemp Crim Just at 286 (cited in note 13).
32 Bushway, 20 J Contemp Crim Just at 280 (cited in note 13).
2008]
The University of Chicago Law Review
records did reduce the differential between whites' and blacks' wages
and the differential between whites' and blacks' employment levels,
but the results were not statistically significant." There were minor
methodological differences between the two papers that probably
explain the differing results.M More puzzling is a follow-up unpub-
lished paper that Finlay recently posted on the internet, which finds
that wages for ex-offenders are significantly lower in states with more
accessible criminal records," that the wages of black male non-
offenders are lower in states with more accessible criminal records,6
and that "non-offenders from groups with higher predicted probabili-
ties [of offending] have better employment outcomes in states with
more open criminal history records. This is consistent with employer
statistical discrimination in the absence of readily available criminal
background checks." 37 Finlay's most recent paper forthrightly con-
cludes that it is hard to know what to make of statistical discrimina-
tion in employment in light of the inconsistent nature of his findings
and incompleteness of the data.""
Reflecting on the Finlay and Bushway research, I suspect that
neither author's work sheds much light on the subject because both
authors are using a noisy data set, and one that is difficult to repli-
cate.39 Finlay and Bushway both emphasize the differences among ju-
risdictions in the availability of criminal history information. But be-
cause a large number of proprietary firms make national criminal re-
cord searches available for a small fee, it is not clear how much of a
difference actually exists between the open-records and closed-
records states that those scholars identify. Indeed, open records does
not mean free access. Washington state, characterized by Finlay as an
open-records jurisdiction, does make criminal history records avail-
able over the internet, but at a cost of $10 per search. ° It is plausible
that most Washington-based employers would prefer to pay a com-
mercial data broker $30 or $40 to search criminal records nationally,
33 Id at 287.
34 In addition to the differences mentioned in note 31, Bushway focused on African-
American employment generally and Finlay focused on young African-American males.
35 Keith Finlay, Effect of Employer Access to Criminal History Data on the Labor Market
Outcomes of Ex-offenders and Non-offenders 14 (unpublished manuscript, Apr 16, 2007), online
at http://client.norc.org/jole/SOLEweb/7348.pdf (visited Jan 12,2008).
36 Id at 16 (noting that the wages of black male non-offenders were about 9 percent lower
in states with open records).
37 Id at 18.
38 Id at 19.
39 The Legal Action Center index of internet availability that both authors use is no longer
available on the Center's website.
40 See Washington State Patrol, WATCH: Washington Access to Criminal History,
https://watch.wsp.wa.gov (visited Jan 12, 2008).
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as opposed to $10 to search records in one state. If that is the case,
then the difference between open-records and closed-records jurisdic-
tions will be too noisy a variable.
To sum up the available data, then, the Holzer et al research is
the best information we have, and it suggests that employer access to
criminal history information displaces statistical discrimination against
African-American males. There is noisier research out there, which
tries to determine what effects interstate variation in the availability
of criminal history records has on employment, but the results are
preliminary, ambiguous, and many of them have not yet survived peer
review. It therefore seems appropriate to tentatively accept the find-
ings of Holzer and his co-authors as the current state of the art, while
recognizing that future economic research will shed more light on this
important question and could prompt reconsideration.
B. Government Information Policy as a Supplement to
Antidiscrimination Law
Given the deleterious consequences of the employer behavior
that Holzer and his co-authors find, it is worth examining the possible
avenues, other than ex post litigation, for the state to prevent statisti-
cal discrimination. One way to protect African Americans and other
disadvantaged groups would be to make them appear indistinguish-
able from whites. Indeed, some efforts to reform antidiscrimination
law have suggested that statistical discrimination can be mitigated if
the relevant decisionmakers are deprived of information about a can-
didate's race, religion, or gender." With less information, decision-
makers presumably will focus more on the black and white of a job
applicant's resume and less on the black or white of a job applicant's
skin. Related efforts, such as the Racial Privacy Initiative that was de-
feated at the polls in California in 2003, ostensibly sought to decrease
racial discrimination by prohibiting the government from collecting
information about individuals' race so that the government could not
disseminate that information at a later date or act upon it."
In the information age, we should consider approaching the sta-
tistical discrimination problem from the opposite direction: using the
41 See, for example, Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidis-
crimination Law, 88 Cal L Rev 1, 14-16 (2000) (discussing orchestral auditions, in which a screen
separates the judges from the auditioning musician). But see Rudy Kleysteuber, Tenant Screen-
ing Thirty Years Later: A Statutory Proposal to Protect Public Records, 116 Yale L J 1344,1350-52
(2007) (proposing that the government try to limit landlords' access to information regarding
tenants' prior involvement in landlord-tenant litigation).
42 For an interesting discussion and critique of this initiative, see Anita L. Allen, Race, Face,
and Rawls, 72 Fordham L Rev 1677, 1686-96 (2004).
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government to help provide decisionmakers with something that ap-
proximates complete information about each applicant, so that readily
discernable facts like race or gender will not be overemphasized and
more obscure but relevant facts, like past job performance and social
capital, will loom larger.
For example, the government might subsidize the creation of in-
formation clearinghouses, so that employee evaluations from prior
employers can be aggregated in one place; it might use tax incentives
to encourage the collection of 360-degree feedback about employees
within firms so that one boss's negative opinion of a former employee
is not given too much weight; the state might publish information
about all individuals' involvement (or lack thereof) in the criminal
justice or bankruptcy systems; it might publish military records that
document individuals' performance and conduct while in the service;
or it might verify and vouch for applicants' educational credentials.1
3
On this theory, a major factor driving unlawful discrimination on
the basis of race, ethnic status, gender, or religion is a lack of verifiable
information about the individual seeking a job, home, or service. By
making the publication of criminal histories tortious," restricting the
ability of information data brokers to disseminate information about
individuals,5 or raising the media's costs of obtaining aggregated
43 Richard Epstein notes in passing the desirability of such efforts and complains that
antidiscrimination law sometimes thwarts them. Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The
Case against Employment Discrimination Laws 40 (Harvard 1992):
The strategy of the law should be to encourage employers to obtain as much individual in-
formation as possible about workers so that they can, pro tanto, place less reliance on broad
statistical judgments. To the extent, therefore, that the present antidiscrimination law im-
poses enormous restrictions on the use of testing, interviews, and indeed any information
that does not perfectly individuate workers, then by indirection it encourages the very sorts
of discrimination that the law seeks to oppose.
But see Strauss, 79 Georgetown L J at 1641-42 (cited in note 9) ("[S]tatistical discrimination can
be reduced if employers are provided with reliable information about employees. This should be
a principal objective of any regulatory regime in this area. Ordinarily, one excellent way to learn
about an employee's qualifications is to hire him or her.").
44 See, for example, Briscoe v Reader's Digest Association, Inc, 483 P2d 34, 43-44 (Cal
1971); Melvin v Reid, 297 P 91,93-94 (Cal App 1931).
45 This was one result of the FTC's actions following the ChoicePoint data privacy breach.
ChoicePoint got into hot water after identity thieves signed up as its customers and obtained a
wealth of financial data concerning individuals. Pursuant to a consent decree, ChoicePoint
agreed to begin checking the credentials of its customers, visiting their places of business, and
auditing their practices. See Order, United States v ChoicePoint Inc, *5-17 (ND Ga 2006), avail-
able online at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/0523069stip.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008)
(detailing the "reasonable procedures" under statute that ChoicePoint had failed to use to limit
consumer reports to those authorized to receive them, and outlining an information security
program that ChoicePoint would adhere to in the future). Subsequently, ChoicePoint stopped
doing business with small companies and began doing business exclusively with large firms. See
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criminal history information that is already in the government's
hands," information privacy protections undermine antidiscrimination
principles. The tradeoff makes privacy law and institutional arrange-
ments that obscure information about individual's reputations far
more problematic than courts and theorists presently suppose.
II. PRAGMATIC CONCERNS
Governmental disclosures of previously private information will
substantially enhance antidiscrimination strategies when two basic
conditions are satisfied. First, statistical discriminators must signifi-
cantly outnumber animus-based discriminators. Second, the informa-
tion that the government is disseminating must be relatively accurate.
A. Animus-based Discriminators
The problem of pretext is daunting in the antidiscrimination con-
text. A decisionmaker adopts a policy because it has a discriminatory
effect, and then insists that the policy is actually motivated by benign
considerations. Sorting among the pretextual and legitimate justifica-
tions for such a policy is one of the more difficult tasks faced by courts
adjudicating discrimination claims. 7 But there are limits on the extent
to which an intentional discriminator can hide behind a nondiscrimi-
natory rationale.
Information constraints provide one such limit. If the only thing a
decisionmaker knows about a job or apartment applicant is his race,
then it is quite difficult to identify a nondiscriminatory basis for ex-
cluding him. If, on the other hand, the decisionmaker has a wealth of
information about an applicant, then it will be easier to identify some
seemingly neutral characteristic that formed the basis for exclusion.
As long as the decisionmaker can remember to exclude contempora-
neous applicants who have that same characteristic, the decisionmaker
likely will be able to convince the court that there was a nonpretextual
basis for exclusion.
Recall that this essay is premised on the idea that animus-based
discrimination is less prevalent than statistical discrimination. Yet
there are surely still many decisionmakers who are motivated by ani-
mus, and it is possible that this form of discrimination remains more
Avivah Litan, Case Study: ChoicePoint Incident Leads to Improved Security, Others Must Follow
2 (Gartner RAS Core Research Note, Sept 19,2006).
46 See, for example, DOJ v Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 US 749, 780
(1989) (holding that criminal rap sheets are exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act because their dissemination would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy).
47 See, for example, Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned about
Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 Notre Dame L Rev 447,503 (1996).
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prevalent in some contexts. Where animus-based discrimination pre-
dominates, a government strategy to provide decisionmakers with
more previously private information about job applicants, apartment
seekers, jurors, or students will make it easier for decisionmakers to
rebut allegations of pretext. In those settings, the gains from decreased
statistical discrimination often would be exceeded by the losses asso-
ciated with easier animus-based discrimination. 9
B. The Effectiveness of Traditional Antidiscrimination Enforcement
Information-based antidiscrimination policies will be most effec-
tive at combating statistical discrimination when traditional enforce-
ment methods are least effective. The explanation is straightforward.
A decisionmaker that wants to screen out ex-offenders might engage
in statistical discrimination against African-American males, but if the
expected legal sanction from engaging in this statistical discrimination
is high enough, then the law will shift the decisionmaker away from
screening altogether. Put another way, we can think of three groups of
decisionmakers: A, those engaged in unlawful statistical discrimination
on the basis of a protected classification; B, those engaged in lawful
statistical discrimination on the basis of a nonprotected classification;
and C, those refusing to engage in statistical discrimination. By provid-
ing previously unavailable information about the identities of ex-
offenders, the state could thus prompt some decisionmakers to shift
from group A to group B, while also prompting other decisionmakers to
shift from group C to group B. Where traditional antidiscrimination law
enforcement is effective, the expected sanction against statistical dis-
criminators is high, and we can expect group C to be large and group A
to be small. But if traditional antidiscrimination law enforcement is in-
effective, and sanctions against statistical discriminators are low, we can
expect group A to be large and group C to be small. Shifting decision-
makers from group A to group B is an unambiguous improvement on
social welfare and justice grounds, but the consequences of prompting
decisionmakers to shift from group C to group B are contestable. The
aggregate benefits of information-based antidiscrimination strategies
48 The issue of implicit bias adds further complexity, as a decisionmaker may be acting on
the basis of animus but not realize he is doing so. See Moran, 79 St John's L Rev at 907-10 (cited
in note 10). For the purposes of this paper, conscious animus-based racism and implicit bias
should be grouped together.
49 I use the word "often" here, rather than "invariably," because of the possibility that
increased reliance on reputational information will facilitate automated decisionmaking, which
could in turn employ algorithms that draw decisionmakers away from the influences of animus.
This argument is made in Tal Z. Zarsky, "Mine Your Own Business!": Making the Case for the
Implications of the Data Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 Yale J
L & Tech 1, 22-35 (2003).
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thus depend on the extent to which we believe current antidiscrimina-
tion enforcement prompts decisionmakers to join group C. The litera-
ture cited in this paper suggests that statistical discrimination on the
basis of race is still quite prevalent, making the information-based
antidiscrimination strategies look appealing.
C. False Information
Efforts to combat statistical discrimination via government in-
formation policy will only accomplish laudable objectives to the ex-
tent that the information disseminated is accurate. Some of the infor-
mation discussed herein-military records, records of criminal convic-
tions, bankruptcy records, immigration and naturalization documents,
and the like-will not pose unmanageable accuracy problems. To be
sure, any system that relies on the government to produce accurate
information will produce errors, but perhaps the best way to detect
and correct those errors will be to make the information available to
the privacy subjects, as the European Union has done," so that the
subjects of the information can dispute inaccuracies. To the extent that
more stubborn errors occur, they will often resolve around cases of
mistaken identity, where someone sharing the same name as another
person with an undesirable characteristic is thereby penalized.5 These
problems can be ameliorated through the use of supplemental identi-
fiers other than names, such as birthdates, birthplaces, and partial so-
cial security numbers. And the related problem of identity theft can be
addressed through a combination of criminal enforcement and in-
creased reliance on photographs, fingerprints, retinal scans, and other
verification technologies. These tradeoffs are familiar: decreased pri-
vacy buys us a reduction in individuals being subjected to inappropri-
ate treatment.
III. NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS
In this Part I will touch upon some of the normative decisions
that will help determine at what point society should embrace the
50 See, for example, Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such
Data, 38 Off J Eur Communities (L 281) 31 (Nov 23,1995).
51 This is a recurring problem with the Department of Homeland Security's no-fly and
restricted lists. See, for example, Rachel L. Swarns, Senator? Terrorist? A Watch List Stops Ken-
nedy at Airport, NY Times Al (Aug 20, 2004) (explaining that airline agents attempted to block
Senator Edward M. Kennedy from boarding airplanes on five separate occasions over the course
of seven days because his name resembled the alias of a suspected terrorist). See also Kleysteu-
ber, 116 Yale L J at 1358-59 (cited in note 41) (discussing this problem in the context of tenant
information databases).
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sorts of policy options developed herein. As the reader will quickly dis-
cern, this Part takes the objectives of existing antidiscrimination law as
a given and asks what information dissemination policies should follow
from that premise.
A. When Is Government Publicity for Previously Private
Information Desirable?
The preceding discussion suggests that it may be desirable for the
government to facilitate the availability of previously private informa-
tion about individuals so as to prevent statistical discrimination on the
basis of suspect classifications. The implicit normative assumption is
that if decisionmakers are going to try to exclude people with undesir-
able characteristics-criminal records, say-it is better that they iden-
tify those with criminal records using accurate criminal history infor-
mation than via a less reliable and more troubling proxy for criminal
backgrounds, such as race or gender. Employment discrimination
against those with criminal records may have social costs, but it has
social benefits as well, and the decision to tolerate such discrimination,
be it in housing, employment, or educational settings, presently com-
mands broad societal support.
There will be other "undesirable" but unobservable characteris-
tics where the social consensus is quite different. Take, for example,
HIV-positive status. 2 HIV-positive individuals are protected against
discriminatory treatment by antidiscrimination laws. Yet some em-
ployers may still prefer to keep HIV-positive individuals out of their
workplaces for reasons rational (for example, concerns about rising
group health insurance premiums) or irrational (stubborn concerns
about the possibility of HIV transmission via casual contact). In the
United States, the HIV virus historically has been disproportionately
prevalent among homosexual men, with male-to-male sexual contact
remaining the predominant method by which HIV-positive Americans
contracted the disease." In recent years, infection rates have risen par-
ticularly sharply among African Americans."
52 The normative dimensions of another example, racial profiling in law enforcement, are
provocatively discussed in Peter H. Schuck, Meditations of a Militant Moderate: Cool Views on
Hot Topics 142-44 (Rowan & Littlefield 2006).
53 See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Cases of HIV Infection in the
United States and Dependent Areas, 2005, Commentary (June 2007), online at http://www.cdc.gov/
hiv/topics/surveillance/resources/reports/2005report/commentary.htm (visited Jan 12,2008) (estimating
that 44.4 percent of those within the United States who are living with HIV/AIDS were infected
through male-to-male sexual contact).
54 See CDC, Fighting HIV among African Americans: A Heightened National Response 1
(Mar 2007), online at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/aa/resources/factsheets/pdf/AA-response-
media-fact.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008) (reporting that African Americans made up 51 percent of
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Given the substantial stigma associated with HIV and the rela-
tively high costs of providing health insurance for HIV-positive em-
ployees, it is likely that homosexual men and African Americans gen-
erally are victimized by statistical discrimination designed to keep
HIV-positive individuals out of the workplace. One possible strategy
for combating this statistical discrimination would be to publicize the
HIV status of every American. That would be a bad idea. As demon-
strated by the Americans with Disabilities Act," and a number of
common law decisions treating HIV status as a "private fact" whose
disclosure is highly offensive to a reasonable person," Americans have
decided that HIV status itself ought to be a protected classification,
and decisions classifying individuals on the basis of HIV status may be
as bad, or nearly as bad, as decisions classifying them on the basis of
race. Indeed, the current absence of antidiscrimination protections for
homosexuals (at least under federal law) suggests that disclosing HIV
status to prevent statistical discrimination against gays would be per-
ceived as swallowing the spider to catch the fly. Involvement in the
criminal justice system is a very different attribute than HIV status,
and courts recently have become less sympathetic to privacy claims
involving the dissemination of the plaintiff's criminal history.
In short, when existing laws and norms tolerate the publication of
information about an individual's attributes, and when in the absence
of such information decisionmakers may statistically discriminate us-
ing a legally suspect classification system, the government should pub-
lish the information in question or facilitate its widespread availability.
But the government should not publish information showing who is a
member of a protected class, such as HIV patients, pregnant women,
Mormons, and the like, even if the resulting statistical discrimination
reduces the opportunities available to HIV-negative homosexual men,
nonpregnant women, or non-Mormon residents of Utah.
HIV diagnoses between 2001 and 2005, with the rate of HIV diagnoses among black men nearly
seven times higher than that of white men).
55 Pub L No 101-336, 104 Stat 327 (1990), codified as amended at 42 USC § 12101 et seq (2000).
56 See, for example, Multimedia WMAZ, Inc v Kubach, 443 SE2d 491,493 (Ga App 1994);
Hillman v Columbia County, 474 NW2d 913,922-23 (Wis App 1991).
57 See, for example, Gates v Discovery Communications, Inc, 101 P3d 552, 562 (Cal 2004);
Sadiq Reza, Privacy and the Criminal Arrestee or Suspect: In Search of a Right, In Need of a Rule,
64 Md L Rev 755,762-63 (2005). But see Norris v King, 355 S2d 21, 23-25 (La App 1978) (reach-
ing a contrary result, but relying on a California precedent that Gates overruled). The Supreme
Court held decades ago that it was not unconstitutional for the government to disseminate in-
formation about a shoplifter's prior arrests. See Paul v Davis, 424 US 693,713 (1976).
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B. How Should Society Promote Second Chances?
The discussion so far has been premised on the idea that it is de-
sirable to help law-abiding African-American males at the expense of
African-American males with criminal records. To defend that proposi-
tion, it is worth exploring the counterarguments -namely, why someone
might want to make it more difficult for private decisionmakers to sort
among those with criminal records and those without criminal records.
There are several possible justifications for this approach. First, we
might expect that those with criminal records will be harmed more than
those without criminal records will be helped. Accordingly, facilitating
effective private sorting will make job applicants as a whole worse off.
Second, we might believe that there are powerful policy justifications
for preventing sorting, perhaps because we believe that criminals who
have served their time deserve a clean slate. Third, we might believe
that the criminal justice system is essentially corrupt; in which case fa-
cilitating sorting merely enhances the unjust penalties meted out by an
arbitrary government apparatus. Of these three arguments, only the last
one has significant force. I will consider them in turn.
First, the best available empirical evidence suggests that African-
American males are more likely to be hired by firms that conduct
criminal background checks than by similarly situated firms that do
not. Recall that Holzer and his co-authors found that those responsible
for hiring appeared to overestimate the propensity of African-American
males to have criminal records, and hire too few African Americans as a
consequence."a Publicizing accurate information about individuals' in-
volvement in the criminal justice system should only adversely affect a
group's available opportunities to the extent that decisionmakers (a) un-
derestimate the prevalence of criminal records among members of a par-
ticular group, or (b) are effectively prevented from engaging in statistical
discrimination to sort out those with criminal records. The Holzer et al
study undercuts both claims, though some of Finlay's unpublished re-
search supports the former claim.
Alternatively, we might think that private sorting creates negative
externalities, and justify keeping criminal histories obscure for that
reason. For example, we might believe on policy grounds that the
availability of employment opportunities for ex-cons will discourage
recidivism. Alternatively, we might have an abstract ideological com-
mitment to the proposition that "everyone deserves a second chance,"
58 Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll, 49 J L & Econ at 473 (cited in note 19). See also Holzer,
Raphael, and Stoll, Will Employers Hire Former Offenders? at 227 (cited in note 11) ("[E]mployers
may overestimate the average incidence of prior conviction among blacks, owing to prejudice or
a general lack of experience with black employees.").
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or, more narrowly, that "someone who has served his time has repaid
his debt to society and should be able to start off with a clean slate."
These sorts of arguments sometimes find their way into the informa-
tion privacy case law and academic literature." In this case, the appro-
priate question to ask is: what is the optimal strategy for preventing
these negative externalities? We can answer this question by drawing
on the tools of optimal redistribution analysis.
The appropriate way to facilitate the hiring of ex-cons who de-
serve a second chance is through direct subsidies to employers who
hire them. Such programs have been implemented, with the discontin-
ued federal Targeted Jobs Tax Credit providing one example and the
current federal tax code's Work Opportunity Credit providing an-
other.6' Implicit tax subsidies to organizations whose missions involve
reintegrating ex-offenders back into the social and economic main-
stream would work similarly well. 2 Alternatively, we can envision gov-
ernment programs to insure employers against the possible downsides
of hiring ex-offenders. Because it is inexpensive for the government to
identify ex-cons, the government can efficiently ensure that only genu-
ine ex-cons benefit from the subsidized second chances. And since the
tax subsidy or insurance programs would be funded out of general tax
revenues, the costs of promoting second chances is borne by taxpayers
as a whole. Compare that regime to the status quo. We try to facilitate
the hiring of ex-cons by raising private decisionmakers' costs of sort-
ing between ex-cons and those with no criminal records. As a result,
many employers evidently use statistical discrimination tools to penal-
ize non-ex-cons, and the ex-cons who do get hired are likely to be
members of groups whose baseline offending rates are low-white
males, and females of all races. Under the present system, only some
of the beneficiaries of the existing "promote second chances through
59 See, for example, Briscoe v Reader's Digest, 483 P2d 34, 41 (Cal 1971) ("In return for
becoming a 'new man,' [the rehabilitated offender] is allowed to melt into the shadows of obscu-
rity."); Melvin v Reid, 297 P 91,93 (Cal App 1931) ("Where a person has by his own efforts reha-
bilitated himself, we ... should permit him to continue in the path of rectitude rather than throw
him back into a life of shame or crime."); Megan C. Kurlychek, Robert Brame, and Shawn D.
Bushway, Scarlet Letters and Recidivism: Does an Old Criminal Record Predict Future Offend-
ing?, 5 Criminol & Pub Policy 483, 498-99 (2006); James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the
Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 U St Thomas L J 387,406-12 (2006).
60 See George K. Yin, et al, Improving the Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor: Pro-
posals to Reform the Earned Income Tax Credit Program, 11 Am J Tax Policy 225,291-92 (1994).
61 See 26 USC § 51(d)(1)(C) (2000); 26 USC § 51(d)(4) (2000) (defining a "qualified ex-
felon" for purposes of the Work Opportunity Credit).
62 The Delancey Street Foundation is a particularly successful example of this type of
organization. See http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/grassroots/SanFranciscoCA.htm (visited
Jan 12, 2008) (describing the Delancey Street Foundation's as "the most acclaimed educational
and rehabilitative institution for ex-offenders in the world").
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information obscurity" program are actually ex-cons, and the costs of
this policy fall heavily on a group that includes other ex-cons and in-
nocent people who share demographic characteristics with ex-cons.
From an optimal redistribution perspective, no one should prefer our
present approach to a tax credit. '
CONCLUSION, OR: How I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING
AND LOVE MEGAN'S LAW
This paper reflects a shift in my thinking about government in-
formation policy. I began as a skeptic of Megan's Law, the computeri-
zation of bankruptcy records, and other policies whereby the govern-
ment made previously private information freely available to the pub-
lic. But I have increasingly begun to appreciate the potential for these
sorts of policies to further social welfare and combat morally prob-
lematic statistical discrimination. Employers, by and large, are not go-
ing to want to hire sex offenders, and banks, by and large, are not go-
ing to want to lend to people with bad credit (at least not without
charging sub prime rates). If the government fails to provide employ-
ers and lenders with information that will enable them to sort out the
sex offenders and the bankruptcy filers, then these employers and
lenders will be tempted to rely on unlawful, but difficult to detect, sta-
tistical discrimination techniques to screen out the undesirables. Such
subtle statistical discrimination is often more troubling than overt dis-
crimination on the basis of criminal or bankruptcy history, and this
analysis shows a myriad of related government strategies for stomping
it out. In short, government information policy stands as a useful, and
perhaps even necessary, supplement to the antidiscrimination laws'
attack on statistical discrimination.
The problem, then, with Megan's Law and internet availability of
bankruptcy filings, is not that they reveal too much, but that they re-
veal too little. Such online resources should be expanded to include all
criminal convictions of adults, as Colorado, Florida, and a handful of
other states have done," and more documents pertaining to individu-
als' financial distress. Indeed, much of the information in the federal
government's National Crime Information Center's (NCIC) database
could be brought online and made available to the general public free
63 Notably, this sort of analysis is absent from Steven Raphael's recent essay on the subject.
See generally Raphael, 5 Criminol & Pub Policy 515 (cited in note 28).
64 See Jacobs, 3 U St Thomas L J at 399-400 (cited in note 59) (noting that Colorado allows
anyone to do a criminal records search over the internet for a small fee and that Florida provides
online access to a directory of current and past state prisoners).
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of charge. If positive spillovers result from the reintegration of ex-
offenders or ex-insolvents into the nation's economic and social life,
and I suspect they do, then direct subsidies or insurance programs, not
information privacy protections, are the appropriate policy lever for
facilitating that reintegration.
65 Selective access to the NCIC database currently presents problems. See Shaun B.
Spencer, Security vs. Privacy: Reframing the Debate, 79 Denver U L Rev 519, 520-21 (2002)
(describing what he sees as the inadequate safeguards to prevent data breaches from insiders at
the NCIC and other government repositories of information).
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